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[L. A. No. 19671. In Bank. Mar. 21, 1947.] 
MURIEL G. BOWMAN, Respondent, v. HARRY P. 
BOWMAN, Appellant. 
[1] Divorce - Permanent Alimony - Discretion of Oourt. - The 
amount of support which a divorced husband must pay is 
within the discretion of the trial court, and the court, in mak-
ing the award, must consider the circumstances of the parties, 
the needs of the wife and the ability of the husband to pay. 
(Civ. Code, § 189.) 
(I] Id.-Permanent Alimony.-While support money awarded in 
• divorce action should normally be paid directly to the wife, 
the trial court may order the sums paid to a trustee for the 
benefit of the wife. 
[1] See 1 Oal.Jur.l012; 17 Am.Jur. 467. 
licK. Dig. References: [1] Divorce, § 206; [2] Divorce, 1198; 
[3] Appeal and Error, §l071; [4] Divorce, § 204; [5J Judgments, 
§ 185; [6,8] Jucigments,I130; [7] Judgments, 1149; [9] Divorce, 
§216. 
.; 
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[3] Appeal-Persons Entitled to Allege Errors-Errors Not In-
Juriously Affecting Appella.nt.-The fact that the eourt in • 
divorce action direeted a trustee, to whom support money was 
paid for the benefit of the wife, to apply the money to the 
payment of debts, thereby restricting her in the ue thereof, 
cannot be objected to hy thf' lm!'lband on an'!'lf'1I1. II!'! ht'! i!'l not 
injured thereby. 
['] Divorce - Permanent Alimony - J?leading.-.A.n interlocutory 
decree requiring alimony payments to a trustee for the benefit 
of the wife was not void because the wife did not request 
alimony in her prayer where she clearly stated in her eom-
plaint that she and defendant were liable for certain debts and 
in her prayer requested that defendant be ordered to pay them, 
and where, in the absence of agreement or sumcient eom-
munity property, it was necessary to award ber alimony in 
order to give her the required relief. 
[6] J'udgment&-Opening and Vacating-'1'ime for Application.-
A trial court may not relieve a defendant from the entry of 
a default when the motion under Code Civ. Proa., § 473, wu 
not made within six months after the entry of default. 
[8] Id.--Change or Amendment.-Where a judgment was rendered 
precisely as intended by the trial judge, its modification can· 
not be based on the power of the trial eourt, under Code Civ. 
Proc., § 473, or independently of it, to cO'l"l"ect clerical erron 
made either by the clerk or by the court. 
[7] ld. - Opening and Vacating--Constrnction of Statute.-Th~ 
purpose of that portion of Code Civ. Prac., § 473, providing 
that a trial court may relieve a party from "a judgment, order 
or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect .•. " is to enable 
trial courts to set aside the judgment, order or proceeding in 
order to allow the party to proceed on the merits rather than 
to allow him to be defeated by a determination or proceeding 
eatu!ed by his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect. 
[Sa, 8'b] ld.--Change or Amendment.-Trial eourts can modify or 
amend their judgments only as prescribed by statute, and a 
lUDlJIlary modification of judgments to correct errors of law is 
not authorued by Code Civ. Proc., § 473. 
[9] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Termination of Allowance.-
A trial eourt has power to terminate payments of support and 
maintenance in a proper case and ou a proper sbowing. 
[8] See 2 Oal.Jnr. 840; 3 Am.Jnr. '"' 
[7] See 14 OaLJnr.10lL 
) 
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APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County and from an order restoring cer-
tain provisions stricken from an interlocutory judgment. 
Kurtz Kauffman and John Beardsley, Judges. Affinned. 
Vincent Scott for Appellant. 
Nicholas & Davis and Harry R. Roberts for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-'l'hese appeals are from an order of the 
superior court restoring certain provisions previously struck 
from an interlocutory decree of divorce and from a final judg-
ment of divorce containing the restored provisions. Plaintiff 
brought an action for divorce on April 13, 1944, requesting 
support for her child. She also alleged that the parties were 
indebted to a credit uIlion and owed money secured by a 
mortgage on a house and lot fonnerly owned by them as joint 
tenants, which became the separate property of plaintiff by 
a quitclaim dced executed by the defendant before the divorce 
action. Plaintiff requested that defendant be required to pay 
these debts and also that the community property, amount-
ing to about $1,000, be distributed. Defendant, an attorney, 
was personally served with process but his default was en-
tered on May 17, 1944. 
Plaintiff stated at the trial that she did not seek alimony 
for herself, but that she wished defendant to pay the fore-
going debts. The interlocutory judgment of divorce, provid-
ing for the distribution of the community property, was 
granted. The trial court granted custody of the child to 
plaintiff and then ordered: 
"3. That the defendant pay to the Court Trustee, for the 
benefit of plaintiff and said minor child, the following 
amounts each month, to-wit: 
"(a) The sum of $50.00 payable $25.00 on the :first day 
of the month, and $25.00 on the fifteenth day of the month, 
for the support of said minor child, Donald Michael Bowman; 
"(b) The sum of $54.05 on the first day of each month for 
payment to Syndicate Mortgage Company to be applied on 
the mortgage on the home place of the parties, until said 
Loan shall have been paid in full; 
" (c) The sum of $43.00 on the first day of each month 
,for payment to Los Angeles Teachers Credit Union to be 
lapplied on the promissory note payable to said Teachers 
I Credit Union until it has been paid in full." 
) 
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Defendant did not appeal from this judgment. Within six 
months after it was entered, but not within six months after 
the entry of the default, he made a motion to open, vacate or 
modify the judgment. This motion was granted to the extent 
that the words "for the benefit of plaintUf and said minor 
child" were struck from the decree. Plaintiff did not appeal 
from this modification but later made a motion requesting th(' 
restoration of the words Rtruek from the interlocutory decree. 
This motion was granted and the final judgment of divorce 
was entered in the same words as the interlocutory decree. 
The payments in question are declared to be for the benefit 
of plaintiff and her child and, since they will serve to provide 
them with the unobstructed use of their home and household 
furniture, they must be regarded as provisions for support and 
maintenance. [1] The amount of support that the husband 
must pay is within the discretion of the trial court (8cMt"b. v. 
Seheibe, 57 Cal.App.2d 336, 343 [134 P.2d 835]) and the 
court, in making the award, must consider the circumstances 
of the parties, the needs of the wife and the ability of the 
husband to pay. (Civ. Code, § 139.) [2] Defendant oem-
tends, however, that the provisions ordering installment pay-
ments are void because the payments are to be made to the 
court trustee. He relies upon eases declaring that orders for 
payment to a person not a party to the action are beyond the 
jurisdiction of the court. (Keck v. Keck, 219 Cal. 316, 322 
[18 P.2d 338]; Stevens v. Stevens, 215 Cal. 702, 704 [12 P.2d 
432]; Samter v. Klopstock. Realty Co., 31 Cal.App.2d 532, 
535 [88 P.2d 250); OvereZl v. Overell, 18 CaI.App.2d 499, 
502 [64 P'2d 483].) The court trustee, however, was not an 
agent of the creditors but a trustee for plaintiff and her minor 
child. (Bohnert v. Bohnert, 91 Cal. 428, 432 [27 P. 732].) 
The sums to be paid to the court trustee were determined by 
the amounts of the debt installments and are to be paid until 
the debts are satisfied. Support normally should be paid 
directly to the wife (Nathan v. Nathan, 102 Neb. 59 [165 
N.W. 955]; Blair v. Blair, 40 Utah 306 [121 P. 19, Ann.Cas. 
1914D 989, 38 L.R.A.N.S. 269]; see 2 Nelson on Divorce, 
§ 14.69), but the trial court may order the sums paid to a 
trustee for the benefit of the wife. (Nemecheck v. Nemecheck, 
250 Mich. 641 [231 N.W. 82]; Yost v. Yost, 143 Neb. 80 I8 
N.W.2d 686] ; Mosey v. Hiestand [Ohio App.] 42 N.E.2d lR6; 
see 2 Nelson on Divorce, § 14.69.) [3] The court directed 
) 
.. .; 
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the trustee to apply the sums to the payment of the debts, 
thereby restricting plaintiff in the use thereof, but she did 
not appeal and defendant cannot show that he is injured by 
the restriction. (Bohnert v. Bohnert, supra, at 432.) De-
fendant is liable for the debts as well as plaintiff and the 
appointment of a trustee, with directions, constituted a bene-
fit to him also, since he was thereby assured that the pay-
ments would be made to the creditors and not otherwise 
d.isposed of by plaintiff. 
[4] Defendant contends that the parts of the interlocu-
tory decree requiring alimony payments to the trustee are 
void because plaintiff did not request alimony in her prayer. 
Plaintiff clearly stated in her complaint that she and de-
fendant was liable for certain debts and in her prayer she 
requested that defendant be ordered to pay them. Al-
though this was not a formal prayer for alimony, it was 
manifestly a request for relief that would give her and her 
child the unobstructed use of the home and household fur-
niture. Plaintiff did not wish ordinary support for herself 
but she wanted the debts paid. In the absence of agreement 
or sufficient community property, it was necessary to a,varu 
her alimony in order to give her the required relief. The 
complaint was sufficient notice to defendant that plaintiff 
might be granted this relief. Plaintiff need not rely solely 
upon the sufficiency of her complaint and prayer, however, 
since it is established that if the relief in excess of prayer is 
alimony, the judgment, although erroneous, is not void. 
(Parker v. Parker, 203 Cal. 787, 792 [266 P. 283]; Cohen 
v. Cohen, 150 Cal. 99, 102 [88 P. 267, 11 Ann.Cas. 520].) 
Defendant contends that he properly attacked the inter-
locutory judgment on the ground that the judgment exceeded 
the relief prayed for and that he was given relief under sec-
tion 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is now final. 
since plaintiff did not appeal. Defendant gave notice of a 
motion to "Open, vacate or modify the default judgment or 
default" within six months after the entry of the judgment, 
but not within six months after the entry of the default. He 
stated therein that the judgment had been taken against him 
by mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect and. 
further. that the decree was erroneous in so far as it awarded 
alimony unsupported by appropriate allegations in plaintiff's 
complaint and prayer. In his affidavit of merits, defendant 
stated that plaintUI and her attorney had misled him and also 
) 
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that, in defaulting, he had relied upon section 580 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, believing that no alimony would be 
awarded 80 long as none had been requested. Upon the hear-
ing of the motion, both parties being represented, the trial 
court ordered ". . . Motion is granted in part as follows: 
the words 'for the benefit of plaintiff and said minor child' 
. . . are stricken. Motion is otherwise denied." The trial 
court did not, however, disturb that part of the decree order-
ing defendant to pay the installments to the court trustee. 
Thus, the trial court attempted to change a part of the decree 
80 that instead of awarding alimony it provided for payments 
to the court trustee, apparently as part of a division of prop-
erty. This change amounted to an amendment of the judg-
ment in order to correct a supposed error of law. 
[5] The trial court could not relieve defendant from the 
entry of the default because the motion under section 473 
was not made within six months after the entry of default. 
(Phillips v. Trusheim, 25 Ca1.2d 913, 917 [156 P.2d 25]; Hu~t, 
Mirk & Co., Inc. v. Hesperides Mini~g Co., 200 Cal. 882, 384 
[253 P. 317]; Title Ins. & T. Co. v. King etc. Co., 162 Cal. 
44,46 [120 P. 1066].) [6] Defendant states, however, that 
he was not attacking the entry of default, but was seeking a 
modification of the judgment to make it correspond to the 
relief requested by plaintiff in her complaint. Defendant 
concedes that the interlocutory judgment was rendered pre-
cisely as intended by the trial judge. The modification of the 
judgment, therefore, cannot be based upon the power of the 
trial court, under section 473 or independent of it, to correct 
clerical errors made either by the clerk or by the court. 
(Bastajia~ v. Brown, 19 Cal.2d 209, 214 [120 P.2d 9].) 
[7] Section 473 also provides that a trial court may relieve 
a party from "a judgment, order, or other proceeding taken 
against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or 
excusable neglect. . . . " The purpose of this provision, how-
ever, is to enable trial courts to set aside the judgment, order 
or proceeding in order to allow the party to proceed on the 
merits rather than to allow him to be defeated by a determina-
tion or proceeding caused by his mistake, inadvertence, sur-
prise or excusable neglect. (Riskin v. Towors, 24 Cal.2d 274, 
279 [148 P.2d 611, 153 A.L.R. 442] j Estate of Simmom, 168 
Cal. 390, 396 [143 P. 697].) The trial court in the present 
case did not attempt to vacate the judgment on the ground 
) 
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of surprise or inadvertence, but attempted to grant defend-
ant's request by modifying the interlocutory judgment to 
correct the supposed error of law. [Sa] Trial courts can 
modify or amend their judgments only as prescribed by statute 
and the summary modification of judgments to correct errors 
of law is not authorized by section 473. The purported change 
in the interlocutory judgment was therefore void. (Steve us 
v. Superior Court, 7 Ca1.2d 110, 112, 114 [59 P.2d 988]; 
Lankton v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.2d 694,696 [55 P.2d 1170]; 
Estate of Potter, 141 Cal. 424, 426 [75 P. 850]; First Nat. 
Bank v. DU1/, 110 Cal. 69, 78 [42 P. 476]; Felton C1umical 
Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.App.2d 622, 628 [92 P2d. 684]; 
see GZougie v. GZougie, 174 Cal. 126, 130 [162 P. 118]; 
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 124 Ca1. 422, 426 [57 P. 225J; D1/er-
ville Mfg. Co. v. HelZer, 102 Cal. 615, 617 [36 P. 928].) 
Defendant contends that even if a court is without authority 
to amend its judgment to correct errors of law, it bas con-
tinuing jurisdiction, under section 139 of the Civil Code, to 
modify its support decrees. [9] It is no longer seriously 
questioned that a trial court bas power to terminate payments 
of support and maintenance in a proper ease and upon :: 
proper showing. (McClure v. McClure, 4 Cal.2d 356, 360 [49 
P.2d 584, 100 A.L.R. 1257J.) [8b] In the present case, 
defendant's notice of motion was based upon the two grounds 
mentioned above, i.e., surprise and relief in excess of prayer. 
The notice of motion was accompanied by defendant's affi-
davit, a proposed answer and an affidavit executed by his 
attorney. Defendant's affidavit stated facts showing surprise 
and alleged that the relief afforded plaintiff was contrary to 
section 580 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He alleged fur-
ther that his attorney had advised him that he bad a valid 
and substantial defense to the action. His attorney's affidavit 
was entitled "Affidavit Supporting Motion to Vacate Judg-
ment." The trial court, upon the hearing of the motion, 
ordered the words "for the benefit of plaintiff and said minor 
child" struck from the interlocutory decree, but did not dis-
turb that part of the decree ordering defendant to pay the 
installments to the court trustee. (McClure v. McClure, supra, 
at 360.) The trial court apparently attempted to convert a, 
judgment for alimony into a division of property. There is' 
nothing in the record to indicate that the trial judge made I, 
bis decision after considering the cireumstances of the parties. ! 
In fact, the order of the court purports to retain, in the inter-: 
.. 
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locutory decree, that part requiring defendant to pay the 
contested sums. The court decided merely that it would be 
erroneous to require him to pay the sums as support and 
maintenance. It is clear that the trial court tnade an attempt 
to rectify a supposed error of law on summary motion 
procedure not allowed by statute. (Lankton v. Superior Court, 
.upra, at 596; StetJens v. Superior Court, npra, at 113; 
Holtum v. Grief, 144 Cal. 521, at 526 r78 P. 11].) 
Subsequent to the purported amendment of the inter-
locutory judgment, plaintiff gave notlce of a motion to re-
store the judgment to its original form. Upon hearing, the 
trial court ordered that the interlocutory decree be restored 
to its original form, and the final judgment of divorce was 
then entered in the words of the original interlocutory 
judgment of divorce. It is from this order and judgment 
that defendant appealed. The trial court was correct in 
enterin~ the final judgment in accord with the language of 
the interlocutory decree since the purported modification 
of that decree was without authority. 
The order appealed from and the final judgment of di-
vorce are 8ffinnoo. 
Gibson,C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
Schauer, J., did not participate herein. 
